Abstract. Ring signatures, first introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman, enable a user to sign a message so that a ring of possible signers (of which the user is a member) is identified, without revealing exactly which member of that ring actually generated the signature. In contrast to group signatures, ring signatures are completely "ad-hoc" and do not require any central authority or coordination among the various users (indeed, users do not even need to be aware of each other); furthermore, ring signature schemes grant users fine-grained control over the level of anonymity associated with any particular signature. This paper has two main areas of focus. First, we examine previous definitions of security for ring signature schemes and suggest that most of these prior definitions are too weak, in the sense that they do not take into account certain realistic attacks. We propose new definitions of anonymity and unforgeability which address these threats, and give separation results proving that our new notions are strictly stronger than previous ones. Second, we show the first constructions of ring signature schemes in the standard model. One scheme is based on generic assumptions and satisfies our strongest definitions of security. Two additional schemes are more efficient, but achieve weaker security guarantees and more limited functionality.
Introduction
Ring signatures enable a user to sign a message so that a "ring" of possible signers (of which the user is a member) is identified, without revealing exactly which member of that ring actually generated the signature. This notion was first formally introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [22] , and ring signatures-along with the related notion of ring/ad-hoc identification schemes-have been studied extensively since then [1, 2, 5, 6, 13, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25] . Ring signatures are related, but incomparable, to the notion of group signatures [8] . On the one hand, group signatures have the additional feature that the anonymity of a signer can be revoked (i.e., the signer can be traced) by a designated group manager. On the other hand, ring signatures allow greater flexibility: no centralized group manager or coordination among the various users is required (indeed, users may be unaware of each other at the time they generate their public keys), rings may be formed completely "on-the-fly" and in an ad-hoc manner, and users are given finegrained control over the level of anonymity associated with any particular signature (via selection of an appropriate ring).
Ring signatures naturally lend themselves to a variety of applications which have been suggested already in previous work (see especially [2, 13, 21, 22] ). The original motivation was to allow secrets to be leaked anonymously. Here, for example, a highranking government official can sign information with respect to the ring of all similarly high-ranking officials; the information can then be verified as coming from someone reputable without exposing the actual signer. Ring signatures can also be used to provide a member of a certain class of users access to a particular resource without explicitly identifying this member; note that there may be cases when third-party verifiability is required (e.g., to prove that the resource has been accessed) and so ring signatures, rather than ad-hoc identification schemes, are needed. Finally, we mention the application to designated-verifier signatures [19] especially in the context of e-mail. Here, ring signatures enable the sender of an e-mail to sign the message with respect to the ring containing the sender and the receiver; the receiver is then assured that the e-mail originated from the sender but cannot prove this to any third party. For this latter application it is sufficient to use a ring signature scheme which supports only rings of size two. Chen et al. [9] propose another application of ring signatures where rings of size two suffice.
Our Contributions in Relation to Previous Work
This paper focuses on both definitions and constructions. We summarize our results in each of these areas, and relate them to prior work.
Definitions of Security Prior work on ring signature/identification schemes provides definitions of security that are either rather informal or seem (to us) unnaturally weak, in that they do not address a number of seemingly valid security concerns. One example is the failure to consider the possibility of adversarially-chosen public keys. Specifically, both the anonymity and unforgeability definitions in most prior work assume that honest users always sign with respect to rings consisting entirely of honestly-generated public keys; no security is provided if users sign with respect to a ring containing even one adversarially-generated public key. Clearly, however, a scheme which is not secure in the latter case is of limited use; this is especially true since rings are constructed in an ad-hoc fashion using keys of (possibly unknown) users which are not validated by any central authority as being correctly constructed. We formalize security against such attacks (as well as others), and show separation results proving that our definitions are strictly stronger than those considered in previous work. In addition to the new, strong definitions we present, the hierarchy of definitions we give is useful for characterizing the security of ring signature constructions.
